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Abstract 
In February 2019, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) created a set of comprehensive rules 
governing the qualifications for participating in the 2020 primary debates. The rules, the first of their kind, 
were the result of over a decade of primary debate mishaps and disagreements. Historically, it was not 
difficult for candidates to qualify for primary debates. There were usually fewer than eight candidates on 
the stage and the debates did not play a large role in the primary winnowing process. But as the number 
of candidates rose, and in light of the Republican’s experience in 2016, the Democrats moved to create 
new rules to re-assert control over the process in 2020. This had three important effects. First, it helped to 
winnow down the field during the 2020 primary, as once candidates were not on the stage, they were 
effectively shut out of the media spotlight and thus out of the public’s consideration. Second, the new 
rules demonstrate an effort by the party to reduce the media’s power and increase their own, though that 
process is incomplete. Third, these rules illustrate a key dilemma for the DNC in the modern era. They are 
attempting to assert control without appearing to assert control, thus posing an interesting challenge 
moving forward. 
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In February 2019, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) created a set of comprehensive 
rules governing the qualifications for participating in the 2020 primary debates. The rules, the 
first of their kind, were the result of over a decade of primary debate mishaps and disagreements. 
Historically, it was not difficult for candidates to qualify for primary debates. There were usually 
fewer than eight candidates on the stage and the debates did not play a large role in the primary 
winnowing process. But as the number of candidates rose, and in light of the Republican’s 
experience in 2016, the Democrats moved to create new rules to re-assert control over the 
process in 2020. This had three important effects. First, it helped to winnow down the field 
during the 2020 primary, as once candidates were not on the stage, they were effectively shut out 
of the media spotlight and thus out of the public’s consideration. Second, the new rules 
demonstrate an effort by the party to reduce the media’s power and increase their own, though 
that process is incomplete. Third, these rules illustrate a key dilemma for the DNC in the modern 
era. They are attempting to assert control without appearing to assert control, thus posing an 
interesting challenge moving forward.  
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Introduction 
In early August 2019, Democratic presidential candidate Senator Kirsten Gillibrand was offering 
branded t-shirts in exchange for a $1 donation. Assuming the custom t-shirt cost $5, the shipping 
and handling cost $5 and the digital advertisement cost $2 per realized donation, she was 
spending $12 to acquire a $1 donation.1 Why would a candidate—especially a candidate 
struggling for money and recognition—spend so much to acquire so little? Normally, we would 
say such an attempt defies logic, but here, there is clear logic: she was attempting to meet the 
Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) grassroots fundraising threshold for the third primary 
debate on September 12th, 2019.  
To qualify for the September debate, Gillibrand or any other candidate would need to 
receive at least 130,000 individual donations and/or receive 2% percent in at least four qualifying 
polls.2 At the time of her request, Gillibrand failed to meet the donor threshold and only had one 
poll with over 2% support.3 To her chagrin, she failed to make the debate and subsequently 
dropped out of the race.4 Gillibrand’s story is not unique. Many other candidates—from Kamala 
Harris to Cory Booker to Steve Bullock—would use similarly counterintuitive tactics to try to 
																																																						
Author’s note: I would like to express my great appreciation to Dr. Matthew Levendusky for his 
insightful and constructive suggestions during the planning and development of this thesis. His 
willingness to give his time so generously has been much appreciated. 
1 Shirt price on customink.com; Standard Group on UPS.com; digital advertising 
assuming .5% penetration on Facebook. 
2 “DNC Announces Details for Third Presidential Primary Debate,” Democrats, May 29, 
2019, https://democrats.org/news/third-debate/ 
3 Burns, Alexander. “Gillibrand Drops Out of 2020 Democratic Presidential Race.” The 
New York Times. The New York Times, August 28, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/kirsten-gillibrand-2020-drop-out.html. 
4 Dan Merica, “Kirsten Gillibrand Drops out of 2020 Presidential Race,” CNN (Cable 
News Network, August 29, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/28/politics/gillibrand-drops-
out-of-race/index.html) 
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make the primary debate stage during the 2020 campaign. The DNC’s decision to include 
fundraising qualifications fundamentally changed the 2020 Democratic primary race.  
This thesis works to understand why the DNC added these rules in 2020 and what effect 
they had on the process. Looking at the historical process, I argue that the party learned—or at 
least tried to learn—from earlier cycles and they developed rules that would help them control 
which candidates would appear on the debate stage, without appearing to shape it too much. 
These conflicting incentives reverberated through this process, and ultimately determined which 
candidates survived and which did not.  
Primary debates are so central because primary voters cannot use partisanship as a 
heuristic device. In a general election, most voters simply vote for the candidate from their party. 
But in a primary election, all candidates share the same party, so the heuristic provides little help 
in making the decision. Candidates therefore must work hard to clearly differentiate themselves 
from their rivals on some salient dimension. However, in a crowded field and in a fractured 
media market, capturing and holding the public’s attention is extremely difficult. The primary 
debates offer candidates—especially those struggling to receive media coverage—an opportunity 
to do just that. In fact, the first 2020 Democratic debates on June 26 and 27th, 2019 had a total of 
33.4 million viewers, or 13 million more viewers than an average Sunday Night Football game.5  
Unsurprisingly then, a strong debate appearance—and a consensus among post-debate 
commentators that a candidate scored political points—boosts a candidate’s standing in the polls 
																																																						
5 Cline, Seth. “Americans Have Stopped Watching the Democratic Debates.” U.S. News 
& World Report. U.S. News & World Report, December 20, 2019. 
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2019-12-20/americans-have-stopped-watching-
the-democratic-debates. 
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and increases donations to his or her campaign.6 For example, Senator Kamala Harris’ breakout 
performance in the first Democratic debate in June 2019 contributed significantly to her rise in 
the polls and perceived legitimacy.7 About an hour into the first Democratic debate for 2020, Ms. 
Harris, a black former prosecutor, criticized frontrunner Joe Biden who was leading the polls at 
the time, for working with segregationist senators in the 1970s and 1980s.8 Then, she attacked 
Joe Biden’s opposition to bussing in the 1970s, saying “there was a little girl in California who 
was a part of the second class to ingrate her public schools….and that girl was me.”9 She not 
only gained popularity for her comments toward Joe Biden, but also from the post-debate 
coverage that replayed the exchange and exalted her performance. She capitalized on her debate 
performance, boosting her polling numbers at the expense of Joe Biden’s.10 The debates are 
especially significant for long-shot candidates, such as Harris, who do not have many other 
opportunities to present their campaign’s pitch to a broad captive audience. Primary debates 
therefore are a critical aspect of the presidential nomination process and are capable of changing 
voters’ attitudes toward candidates.11   
																																																						
6 Fridkin, Kim L., Patrick J. Kenney, Sarah Allen Gershon, Karen Shafer, and Gina 
Serignese Woodall. “Capturing the Power of a Campaign Event: The 2004 Presidential Debate in 
Tempe.” The Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007): 770-85. 
7 Schouten, Fredreka. “Kamala Harris Shines in Commanding Democratic Debate 
Performance.” CNN. Cable News Network, June 28, 2019. 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/politics/kamala-harris-democratic-debate-
performance/index.html. 
8 Stevens, Matt. “When Kamala Harris and Joe Biden Clashed on Busing and 
Segregation.” The New York Times. The New York Times, July 31, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/us/politics/kamala-harris-biden-busing.html. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Stevens, Matt. “Kamala Harris Surges in 3 Polls After Strong Debate Performance.” 
The New York Times. The New York Times, July 2, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/politics/kamala-harris-polls.html. 
11 Fridkin et al. 
	 	 							Charap 
	 6	
Despite the importance of presidential primary debates, the topic is remarkably 
understudied. Political science research has primarily focused on the party’s role in the 
nomination process and communications scholars have largely directed their attention to 
identifying the effects of the media’s coverage of primaries, debate rhetoric and formats.12 Here, 
I examine the requirements for making the primary debate stage and how that process has 
changed over time, focusing on the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential primaries and on the 
Democratic party. I analyze these earlier elections to try to understand how these events 
influenced the Democratic party’s decision in the 2020 cycle. I also analyze the 2016 Republican 
primaries, as the Democrats no doubt had this experience in their mind as they deliberated about 
how to execute their own 2020 primary.  
I argue that there were four crucial factors that explain why the DNC changed the 
primary debate process in 2020. First, I hypothesize that the increase in the number of candidates 
vying for the party’s nomination contributed to the DNC’s decision to take control of the debate 
requirements. The party would like a short-lived and relatively controversy free primary 
process—a small field where a party insider could easily capture the nomination. Their fear is 
that a long primary may weaken the ultimate candidate and make it more difficult to unite the 
party, so the party would prefer a short and relatively conflict-free process. In addition, after 
witnessing the chaos during the Republican Party’s primary in 2016, the DNC decided they 
wanted a more controlled process. Prior to 2020, the Democratic primary debates played a 
limited role in winnowing the field, instead allowing candidates to drop out naturally. In 2020, 
																																																						
12 Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Christopher 
Adasiewicz. “What Can Voters Learn from Election Debates?” Televised Election Debates, 
2000, 25–42. 
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the DNC would attempt to use strict debate qualification rules to pressure candidates to drop out 
earlier. They believed that failure to make the debate stage would be a signal to voters that a 
candidate is no longer viable and therefore pressure the candidate to drop out. Stricter rules 
would help to winnow the field.  
Second, I hypothesize that the DNC made the primary requirement change to clarify 
previous inconsistencies in the rules. In previous cycles, primary debate rules were either set by 
the party or news networks. In many cases, the rules were not clearly communicated to 
candidates. The ensuing confusion and complaints made the DNC seem disorganized and biased.  
Third, I hypothesize that the DNC created the rules to take power out of the hands of for-
profit media outlets. While media outlets are incentivized by profit, the DNC is concerned with 
producing a viable candidate in the general election. The misaligned incentives created friction 
between the party and news outlets. The DNC created a policy that works in the party’s favor. 
Finally, I hypothesize that the new criteria, which are stricter than in past cycles, 
disproportionately hurt longshot candidates. The rules make it more difficult to qualify for 
debates and function to winnow the field quickly. Better known candidates with organized 
campaigns and early funding are much more likely to make the debate stage and stand out to 
voters. 
This thesis begins with a discussion of the previous political science and communications 
literature on the topic, and then presents a historical analysis of previous debate requirements 
with a focus on the 2008, 2016 and 2020 election cycles. After the analysis, I discuss my 
hypotheses and the evidence that supports them. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the findings 
and their importance and offering advice on future research. 
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Literature Review 
A political party, according to Edmund Burke, is an association of persons united by a common 
principle.13 In Political Parties, Durverger classifies political parties as organized groups seeking 
power through Democratic elections or revolution.14 While these two scholars define parties 
using political theory, Robert Hucksburn offers a more pragmatic definition. He believes parties 
are “an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting 
elections in the hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public 
offices and the organization of government.”15 Similarly, Aldrich believes that competition for 
office is the “singular, defining characteristic of the major American political party.”16 Aldrich 
concludes that these groups are ultimately concerned with winning above all else.17 A political 
party is thus an organized group of people that try to elect politicians that share their common 
principles. 
Political scholars are consistent in their view that parties seek to recruit candidates that 
can win elections to implement their policy goals. In Down’s view, parties seek to win elections 
and translate them into legislative achievements.18 The party’s new policies will help them gain 
new supporters in future elections. In theory, the relationship between elections and policy 
creates a positive feedback loop. In sum, parties are tasked with finding the candidates that are 
																																																						
13 Burke, Edmund. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: Volume 1 
Paperback. New Edition ed., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012. muse.jhu.edu/book/18234. 
14 Duverger, M. Political Parties. London: Methuen, 1978. 
15 Huckshorn, R. J. Political Parties in America. Monterey: Brooks-Cole Publishing 
Company, 1984. 
16 Aldrich, John H. Why Parties?: Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 283, 12. 
17 Ibid, 21. 
18 Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal 
of Political Economy 65, no. 2 (1957): 135-50. Accessed February 19, 2020. 
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best able to win elections and support the party agenda. Using this definition, scholars have 
attempted to determine the specific groups within a party that set the party’s platform and control 
the nomination process.  
Scholars disagree on who wields power in political parties. Schattsneider’s theory 
emphasizes the importance of interest groups. His theory assumes that government authority is 
for specific policy purposes.19 He finds that a party that can serve interest groups and enact their 
policies will be successful in the long-run. Similarly, McCarty and Schickler conclude that 
parties are best viewed as coalitions of intense policy demanders.20 Cohen notes that “across the 
entire span of American history, parties behave in the same basic way—as vehicles by which the 
most energized segments of the population attempt to pull government policy toward their own 
preferences.”21 These scholars place interest groups and activists at the center of the party. While 
these theories are important for understanding how party platforms and policy are crafted, the 
influence of intense-policy demanders and interest groups is subdued early in the presidential 
primary process. Instead, the political elite play an outsized role at the beginning of the 
nomination season.  
Unlike congressional primaries, to succeed in a presidential primary, a candidate needs to 
develop a large organization, a strong fundraising base, and endorsements from key political 
leaders. In congressional and local primary elections, the barriers to entry are relatively low and 
																																																						
19 Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. “After the ‘Master Theory’: Downs, 
Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis.” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 
(2014): 643–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714001637. 
20 Mccarty, Nolan, and Eric Schickler. “On the Theory of Parties.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 21, no. 1 (November 2018): 175–93. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-
061915-123020. 
21 Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
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a robust grassroots campaign can carry the day. In 2018, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez famously 
defeated Joe Crowley, a 20-year veteran in the House and establishment Democrat, in the 
primary for New York’s 14th district. In this sort of local contest, a long-shot has at least a 
chance to defeat an establishment candidate.   
However, due to the complex nature of the presidential nomination process, the barriers 
to entry are extremely high. To be competitive, candidates must establish a large cash base and a 
strong campaign organization even before the first primary or caucus.22 First, candidates are 
forced to campaign in states in which many of them have never competed. They need to develop 
new relationships with local organizers that can help them host events and increase their name 
recognition. Candidates without national appeal or connections have a lot of trouble developing 
these networks. Moreover, candidates have dozens of expenses that they need to cover, including 
campaign offices, staff salaries and advertisements. In addition, Democratic campaigns need 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for voter registration files for early primary states. These files 
help the candidates determine where to focus their campaign’s energy in the early states.23 If a 
candidate does well in the early states, they will need additional funds to mobilize their campaign 
across over a dozen states for Super Tuesday, assuming they have not already done so. The vast 
network and extreme costs associated with presidential primaries make it difficult for lesser 
known local politicians or non-billionaires to compete.  
																																																						
22 Adkins, Randall E., and Andrew J. Dowdle. “The Money Primary: What Influences the 
Outcome of Pre-Primary Presidential Nomination Fundraising?” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2002): 256-75. Accessed February 19, 2020. 
www.jstor.org/stable/27552387. 
23 DeSilver, Drew. “Voter Files: What Are They, How Are They Used and Are They 
Accurate?” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, February 15, 2018. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/15/voter-files-study-qa/. 
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Primary candidates are more dependent on those with connections, also known as the 
party elite, than they are in congressional primaries—for example, think of the crucial role 
played by South Carolina Representative Jim Clyburn in 2020. His endorsement of Vice 
President Joe Biden galvanized supporters and catapulted Biden to an overwhelming victory in 
the state.24 After that victory, the rest of the party consolidated behind him and Biden was able to 
accumulate an effectively insurmountable delegate lead by mid-March, despite having been 
declared effectively dead a few weeks prior. While this case is perhaps the most vivid example in 
recent decades, one could tell a similar (albeit less dramatic) story about Hillary Clinton’s 
eventual win over Sanders in 2016. Even before the first primary, Hillary Clinton had raised 
significantly more money and gained more endorsements than Sanders. Being able to unite the 
party behind you is crucial in a presidential campaign.  
Many scholars have focused on how the party elite exercises its power in presidential 
primary elections. This takes place before the first primary, known as the invisible primary. The 
group consists of present and former congressmen, senators, governors and wealthy donors. 
They influence the process by endorsing candidates in the race.25 Elite endorsements can help 
candidates by serving as a sign to voters of legitimacy. Elites can also help candidates by tapping 
into their local connections to integrate the candidate and their campaign staff in the community. 
Moreover, elites can influence media coverage on behalf of a candidate and help them raise 
money. Cohen asserts that endorsements are predictors of a candidate’s support, media coverage 
																																																						
24 Davis, Susan. “Joe Biden Gets Boost With Endorsement Of Influential South Carolina 
Democrat.” NPR, February 26, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/02/26/808856350/clyburn-
endorses-biden-ahead-of-south-carolina-primary. 
25 Steger, Wayne P. “Conditional Arbiters: The Limits of Political Party Influence in 
Presidential Nominations.” PS: Political Science & Politics 49, no. 4 (2016): 709–15.  
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and fundraising.26 He concludes that party support is the judgement of a small group of party 
members. Successful candidates are those that have built strong campaigns during the invisible 
primary.  
Finally, Anderson finds that party elite have an incentive to “nominate an electorally 
viable and ideologically unifying candidate.”27 For the elite, supporting a losing candidate is an 
extremely risky decision. While they may receive a high-level position in the administration if 
the candidate wins, they can also be ostracized if the candidate loses. The political elite are 
incentivized to pick candidates that will win and best represent the party.   
The Democratic National Committee is the epitome of the political elite. The group is 
composed of 200 chairs and vice-chairs chosen by primary voters or a state’s Democratic Party’s 
central committee.28 The group coordinates the party’s official platform and policy goals. In 
addition, it controls the party’s official financing and the primary convention. After the 
convention, the party works with the nominee to raise funds, commission polls and establish a 
campaign strategy. The DNC, however, is supposed to remain neutral until the convention. 
Nevertheless, elites in the DNC exert their will on the presidential election process by setting 
nomination rules and requirements. 
Seniors officials create procedures that benefit their desired nominee and that hurt 
outsiders. For example, all DNC members exert power during the convention as super delegates. 
Super delegates can pledge support to their desired candidate at the party’s presidential 
																																																						
26 Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
27 Anderson, Christopher L. “Which Party Elites Choose to Lead the Nomination 
Process?” Political Research Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2013): 61-76. Accessed February 18, 2020.  
28 “The Charter and Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United States,” 2018. 
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convention. These unelected and unpledged delegates make up 15% of the total delegate count.29 
In 2016, these delegates were critical for Hillary Clinton’s victory over Bernie Sanders. Clinton, 
who had support from the party elite, had a significant advantage. The DNC changed the rules in 
2020 to allow super delegates to vote only if there is no winner after the first ballot at the 
convention.30 Sanders complained that it was unfair for super delegates to influence the 
nomination process because they are supposed to be neutral.31 Moreover, he alleged that super 
delegates take away from the democratic nature of the primary process. The 2020 super delegate 
rule change demonstrates how the party elite influences the nomination process. While the DNC 
changed the super delegates rules, they also made other rules changes, like the strict debate 
requirements, that were intended to favor more establishment candidates. 
 In addition to the party elite, the media plays a large role in the primary process. Geer et 
al find that it is often difficult for voters to differentiate primary candidates on major policy 
issues.32 Thus, primary candidates organize their campaigns in a manner that increases their 
media coverage.33 The media educates voters on differences in primary candidates in two major 
ways. First, media outlets educate voters through news reports and commentary. Second, 
candidates use the media to speak directly to voters through advertisements and interviews. Per 
																																																						
29 Ibid. 
30 Levy, Adam. “DNC Changes Superdelegate Rules in Presidential Nomination 
Process.” CNN, Cable News Network, 25 Aug. 2018, 
www.cnn.com/2018/08/25/politics/democrats-superdelegates-voting-changes/index.html. 
31 Strauss, Daniel, et al. “Sanders Supporters Revolt against Superdelegates.” POLITICO, 
14 Feb. 2016, www.politico.com/story/2016/02/bernie-sanders-superdelegates-democrats-
219286. 
32 Geer, John, Richard Lau, David Nickerson, and Lynn Vavreck. "Advertising in an Era 
of Choice." manuscript. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Vanderbilt University 
(2012). 
33 Aldrich, John H. “A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination 
Campaigns.” American Political Science Review 74, no. 3 (1980): 651–69. 
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DeFleur’s media dependency theory, the media plays a substantial role in altering an audience’s 
beliefs, behaviors and feelings.34 Thus, it is important for primary candidates to get media 
coverage. The coverage can help a candidate spread their message and increase their name 
recognition. Debates and post-debate coverage give candidates access to critical media attention. 
The media also creates momentum during the campaign. In their book, Media and 
Momentum, Orren and Polsby emphasize the bandwagon effect whereby “a candidate portrayed 
in the media as viable and as improving begins to attract more and more support.”35 Positive 
media coverage of early winners contributes to a voter’s awareness and perception of 
candidates.36 Debate media coverage gives candidates the opportunity to expand their base and 
demonstrate their qualifications, character and viability.  
Primary debates also help to inform the public about where the candidates stand on the 
issues. Benoit et al determine that “primary debates increase issue knowledge, influence 
perceptions of candidates’ character, and can alter voter preferences.”37 These effects are larger 
in primary debates, largely because the candidates are less well-known to voters, so their 
attitudes are more pliable and susceptible to persuasion. Best and Hubbard reach similar 
conclusions on the impact of primary debates. The authors conclude that “televised primary 
																																																						
34 Ball-Rokeach, S.J., and M.L. DeFleur. “A Dependency Model of Mass-Media 
Effects.” Communication Research 3, no. 1 (January 1976): 3–21. 
35 Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby, Media and Momentum: the New Hampshire 
Primary and Nomination Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), p.6 
36 John G. Geer, Nominating Presidents (New York: Greenwood, 1989); Scott Keeter and 
Cliff Zukin, Uniformed Choice: The Failure of the New Presidential Nominating System (New 
York: Praeger, 1983); Thomas E. Patterson, The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose 
Their President (New York: Praeger, 1980).  
37 Benoit et al., The Primary Decision, 344, 346; Kendall, Communication in Presidential 
Primaries, 88. 
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debates can exercise considerable influence on voter preferences.”38 After being exposed to 
primary debates, voters increase their political engagement and will use debate performance to 
evaluate candidates. Americans that do not watch the debates are less knowledgeable and less 
willing to evaluate candidates. Finally, the authors note that Americans are more likely to change 
their policy views after watching a debate.39  By learning about the policy views and arguments 
of different candidates, Americans become more open to change.  
 Since a voter watching the debate becomes more willing to change their views, a solid 
debate performance is extremely important to candidates. Viewers may alter their views to match 
that of a candidate who performed exceptionally well on the debate stage. Moreover, the rising 
number of debates gives voters more opportunities to change their minds. Thus, primary debates 
are increasingly important in determining the eventual nominee. 
It is critically important for candidates to try to make the debate stage. If a candidate 
cannot make the debate, they cannot get the boost their campaign may need to attract a wider 
audience. Subsequently, they will not rise in the polls and it will be difficult for them to raise 
more money. Those that are not allowed on the debate stage face a downward spiral that is 
difficult to escape. Therefore, candidates clearly make it a priority to make the campaign stage. 
 
Historical Analysis  
Presidential primary debates have become a common tool for voters and candidates in the 
nomination process. The history of primary debates is surprisingly longer than that of general 
																																																						
38 Best, Samuel, and Clark Hubbard. “The Role of Televised Debates in the Presidential 
Nomination Process.” In In Pursuit of the White House 2000. New York: Chatham House, 2000, 
278. 
39 Ibid. 
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election debates. In fact, since 1976 every presidential primary cycle has featured at least two 
debates. These events are highly publicized and routinely draw millions of viewers.40 Yet, it is 
unclear how the debate participants were chosen and thus afforded the privilege to speak to these 
viewers and gain free media coverage. 
As debates have become more important, so have debate requirements. Making the 
debate stage can be key to fundraising and garnering new supporters. Thus, media outlets and 
parties need to make difficult decisions regarding debate inclusion. Pew’s Chartable Trust’s 
“Report of the Task Force on Campaign Reform” sums up the problem: 
“Perhaps the most consequential decision that must be made by any debate 
sponsor is which candidates should be invited to participate. Here, we see a 
powerful tension between the competing values of inclusiveness and 
coherence. On one hand, providing access to minor-party and independent 
candidates may stimulate interest in the campaign and inject new issues and 
ideas into the debate. That is all good. On the other hand, participation by 
minor candidates may reduce and fragment the time and attention available to 
the major candidates, diluting their best opportunity to convey their 
perspectives and proposals to the electorate.”41  
  Before 1972, the primary process was entirely controlled by elites and the party. 
The Frazier-McGovern reforms democratized the process and rewarded candidates that 
had run successful campaigns. After the reforms, the elite and the DNC struggled to 
																																																						
40 Ibid, 255. 
41 “New Realities, New Thinking”: Report of the Task Force on Campaign Finance 
Reform. PS: Political Science and Politics 30, no. 3 (1997): 487-89. 
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influence the nomination process. The DNC wanted to prevent the rise of outsider 
candidates and let the invisible primary do its job. In the primary cycles prior to 2020, it 
became clear to officials that they could use the primary debates to winnow candidates. 
After the GOP 2016 primary debate debacle and complaints about media sponsors and 
candidates during the Democratic primary debates, the DNC decided to create 
comprehensive debate qualification. The DNC could reassert its influence and winnow 
the field with its own rules while appearing to remain impartial.  
 
Debates from 1956-1976 
The first Democratic primary debate took place in 1956 between Estes Kefauver and 
Adlai Stevenson. During the 1960, 1968, 1972 and 1976 cycles there were a total of ten primary 
debates and each debate had an average of 3.2 candidates on the stage. The primaries and 
primary debates themselves were not determinative of the overall result. During the 1950s, 
William Carleton notes that an “astute politician [could] reach the presidency merely by the quiet 
search for delegates and the lining up of congress local leaders and bosses.”42 This was the era of 
the smoke-filled conference room where Democratic congressional leaders would meet to decide 
their party’s nominee. While the debates contributed to voters’ assessment of the candidates, it 
played almost no role in determining the eventual nominee.  
The Frazier-McGovern reforms, instituted in 1971, forced party elite to accept the 
nomination of those that had run successful national pre-convention campaigns.43 The reforms 
occurred after what Cohen calls “the outrageous nomination of Herbert Humphrey.”44 Humphrey 
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did not participate in any of the primary debates and did not run on the ballot in any of the ten 
primary states. The Democratic president, Lyndon Johnson, did not want George McGovern or 
Eugene McCarthy, the two candidates on the ballot, to win the nomination because they were 
against the Vietnam War. Instead, a pro-war Humphrey won the nomination at the convention by 
garnering support form party bosses.45 The Frazier-McGovern reforms were agreed to by the 
DNC after the nomination. The rules took power away from the political elite and ensured that 
party bosses could not hand-pick nominees. The reforms required states to hold primary elections 
to select which delegates would be sent to the party convention. Each state was allocated 
delegates based on their state’s population. The reforms made campaigns and winning primary 
elections more important.  
 
Primary Debate Qualification 1984-2004 
 The Democratic primary debate qualifications continued to be unimportant from 1984 to 
2004. The number of established candidates vying for their party’s nomination in each cycle in 
this period was under ten. There was no need for a multi-night debate, nor strict debate 
requirements.  
 In 1984, the Democratic party decided to increase the number of primary debates from 
three to ten. The first debate was held that year in Hanover, New Hampshire and included eight 
candidates. This was the most candidates the Democrats would have on one debate stage until 
the first debate in 2004. The first debate in 1984 occurred just days before the New Hampshire 
primary. At the time, the debates did not play a role in the winnowing process because none of 
the candidates were excluded from the stage. Instead, candidates dropped out after they fell 
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behind in the delegate count. By the seventh debate, which occurred after Super Tuesday, there 
were only three candidates left on the stage. In 1984, the winnowing on the debate stage occurred 
after the candidates began to lose delegates, not because they were excluded from the debate. 
Thus, candidate qualifications for the debates during the 1984 primary were not significant.  
 The Democratic debate qualifications in 1988, 1992 and 2000 were also not critical and 
did not impact the winnowing process. There was a total of 37 debates between these three 
primary cycles and each debate had an average of 3.8 candidates. In 1988, the debate schedule 
was moved forward. Instead of starting in January of the election year, it started in August of the 
year before. Nevertheless, the original seven candidates participated in most of the debates until 
Super Tuesday. After Super Tuesday, the number of candidates dropped to three. Like 1984, 
most of the candidates waited until after Super Tuesday to drop out of the race based on their 
delegate count. Again, failing to meet debate qualifications does not appear to contribute to 
dropping out of the race. In 1992 and 2000, the same phenomenon is apparent. The 1992 primary 
cycle had six candidates on the stage after New Hampshire. After Super Tuesday, the field 
winnowed to three. In 2000, there were only two candidates on the debate stage, Senator Bill 
Bradley of New Jersey and former Vice President Al Gore of Tennessee. During this primary 
cycle neither candidate dropped out prior to the convention. It is clear from these historical 
examples that losing state primary elections was the determining factor in dropping out of the 
race not participation in the debates. During this period, debate qualification did not play a role 
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2004 Debates 
 The 2004 Democratic debates featured an unprecedented number of candidates. The first 
debate in September 2003 included nine candidates, including Vermont governor Howard Dean, 
North Carolina Senator John Edwards, House minority leader Richard Gephardt, Florida Senator 
Bob Graham, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich, 
Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman, Illinois Senator Carol Mosely-Braun and the Reverend Al 
Sharpton. Again, the debate requirements were not impactful in the winnowing of the candidates. 
Seven candidates were on the debate stage before the New Hampshire and South Carolina 
primaries. By Super-Tuesday on March 2nd, there were only four candidates left. The debate 
requirements in this campaign did not exclude candidates, rather candidates were dropping out 
on their own after they failed to accumulate delegates. 
There was another factor at play in the winnowing process during the 2004 debates: 
front-loading. In the 2004 primaries, the DNC and state parties decided to schedule all the 
primaries within several weeks of each other.46 Previously, candidates had several weeks 
between primaries, allowing them time to campaign in each state. In 2004, it was difficult for 
candidates to effectively communicate their positions to voters in many states. In addition, the 
candidates were forced to be strategic with their limited funds and were unable to campaign 
widely or advertise effectively in each state. The DNC justified the front-loaded schedule by 
claiming “the most important part of any primary schedule is that it needs to identify a strong 
Democratic nominee early and lead to a Democratic victory in the general.”47 Busch and Mayer 
find the schedule put pressure on non-front runners by making it difficult to retain a reliable flow 
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of campaign funds.48 Second, they conclude the schedule increased the organizational demands 
on non-front runner candidates. The changes pushed six out of nine candidates out of the race by 
mid-February. Here, the debates did not put pressure on candidates, but rather the primary 
schedule did. 
 
2008 Debates: Debate Requirements Matter 
 In the 2008 Democratic primary cycle, the debate qualifications became more important 
in the winnowing process. This cycle featured an unprecedented 20 debates, four more than 
2004. There were eight candidates on the stage in Orangeburg, South Carolina for the first debate 
in April of 2007. In December, there were six candidates and after the New Hampshire primary 
there were only four candidates. Unlike previous years, two semi-major candidates, Dennis 
Kucinich and Mike Gravel, were excluded from the debates prior to the first caucus in Iowa 
because of differing debate qualifications imposed by media outlets in New Hampshire and 
Nevada. The debates qualifications played a significant role in winnowing the field. Moreover, it 
was not the DNC excluding the candidates, but rather the media outlets that arranged the debates. 
The exclusion of the two candidates and the media’s role in the debates represents a dramatic 
shift in the primary debate system. 
 Starting in September of 2007, six months before Iowa, media outlets were trying to 
exclude Dennis Kucinich from participating in the Democratic debates. Kucinich was the Mayor 
of Cleveland and a former congressman from Ohio. He ran for the Democratic nomination in 
2004 and dropped out in March. While he was included in all the debates during the 2004 cycle, 
he frequently criticized the news media for not covering him. He condemned ABC News for 
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removing a reporter that was following his campaign. ABC responded by claiming they were 
focusing more viable candidates.49 A similar trend followed his candidacy in 2008. 
Early in the 2008 nomination process, media outlets sought to exclude the former 
congressman. In an unsanctioned debate hosted by AARP in New Hampshire on September 20th, 
2007, Kucinich was excluded for not meeting the debate requirements. AARP claimed that he 
had not met their debate standard by failing to have an “Iowa campaign office and the 
employment of an Iowa campaign staff representative by no later than August 1, 2007.”50 
Kucinich had an office in the state, but it was run out of a friend’s house and did not meet 
AARP’s requirements.51 The same requirements were used for the Des Moines Register debate 
on December 13th. Again, Kucinich was excluded because the organizers concluded “that a 
person working out of his home did not meet our criteria for a campaign office and full-time paid 
staff in Iowa.”52 In another debate, ABC News decided to exclude him “because [he] did not 
place first through fourth in Iowa, poll 5 percent or higher in one of the last four major New 
Hampshire surveys, or poll 5 percent or higher in one of the last four major national surveys.”53 
Although these debates were weeks before the first caucus in Iowa, media outlets were 
attempting to exclude Kucinich.   
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The last straw for Dennis Kucinich was being disinvited from the NBC Las Vegas debate 
on January 15th, 2008. NBC changed the requirements to prevent him from appearing. At first, he 
was included in the debate because he had averaged three to four percent support in recent 
Nevada polls.54 NBC changed the criteria to include only candidates who had placed first, second 
or third in either the Iowa caucuses or New Hampshire primaries.55 He sued NBC in Nevada 
claiming that NBC was infringing on his first amendment right to free speech. He complained 
that NBC was attempting to muzzle a “candidate who has duly qualified to participate in the 
political process in violation of the prior offer to allow the participation.”56 To his chagrin, the 
Supreme Court of Nevada ruled against him. His campaign failed to meet the standard of 
irreparable harm. The court ruled that NBC is a private company and there was no contract that 
guaranteed Kucinich’s participation. Kucinich’s exclusion from the debates before and after the 
first primaries demonstrate the media’s attempt to control the nomination process. After missing 
the next four debates and failing to accumulate delegates or funding, Kucinich dropped out of the 
race. He was not the only the candidate during the 2004 Democratic primaries to be excluded 
from debates before Iowa. 
 Mike Gravel was also excluded from debates before the first primary. Gravel is a former 
Senator from Alaska and is famous for reading the Pentagon Papers on the floor of the Senate in 
1971. Media outlets first tried to exclude Gravel from the debate stage in July 2007, four months 
before Iowa. CNN and YouTube, the debate organizers, claimed that their “criteria simply 
identifies candidates that have measurable public support for their campaign. Because Mike 
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Gravel has not demonstrated measurable public support for his campaign to date, he has not 
received an invitation.”57 After complaining about the decision, Gravel participated in the eight 
candidate CNN debate. On August 7th, Gravel was yet again excluded from a debate for not 
filling out a questionnaire that the host, AFL-CIO, required.58 On August, 9th, Gravel was not 
invited to the LGBT Network debate because he failed to meet the $100,000 fundraising 
threshold.59 After arguing against the unfair requirement, claiming it limited free speech, they 
allowed him to participate.60 The LGBT Network’s requirement marks the first time that 
fundraising was used as a debate requirement for Democratic candidates. On October 30th, 
Gravel was excluded from an NBC debate because he had not “campaigned in New 
Hampshire and/or Iowa at least 14 times in the past year, did not poll high enough in national 
polls and had not raised more than US$1 million.”61 Upon this news, a hedge fund manager 
famously donated $1 million to Gravel’s campaign.62 Nonetheless, he was not included. Gravel 
left the Democratic party in March of 2008 to run for the nomination as a Libertarian. 
The campaigns of Gravel and Kucinich demonstrate the power of the media and the 
importance of consistent debate qualifications. Both candidates were excluded from debates. 
They argued against the decisions, understanding the importance of debates in creating campaign 
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momentum. Moreover, the inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary requirements of 2008 were a 
signal to the Democratic party that changes needed to be made. The media had demonstrated it 
had too much control over the process and the party realized it had too little. These 2008 debate 
qualifications troubles compounded with the GOP’s chaotic debate stages in 2016, made it clear 
to senior DNC officials that they needed to make a change.   
 
2008, 2012 and 2016 Debates: A Lesson from the GOP 
 The 2008 GOP primary debates were equally as inconsistent as those of the Democrats in 
2008. The GOP had 20 debates from May 2007 to February 2008. In Intraparty Democracy and 
the 2016 Election, Julia Azari and Seth Masket find only three instances during that time in 
which the debate requirements were clearly enumerated. The second debate, which occurred in 
May, required a threshold of one percent in South Carolina and national polls.63 A businessman, 
named John Cox, sued Fox Broadcasting Network for excluding him from the debate. A judge 
later ruled that free speech rights did not apply because a primary debate is not a public forum.64 
This was the same argument used by the Supreme Court of Nevada to exclude Kucinich. Ron 
Paul, a Texas congressmen, was also excluded from a Fox News debate before the New 
Hampshire primary. Paul performed well in Iowa and his campaign had succeeded in its 
fundraising efforts.65 With the respect to the 2008 GOP debates, Azari and Masket found that 
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“the networks appear[ed] to have cherry-picked the polls it used, crafting criteria to exclude 
specific candidates.”66 
 In 2012, the GOP attempted to reconcile the errors they made in 2008. Media outlets 
created clearer standards for their debates. They included specific lists of polls that could be used 
to qualify for debate inclusion.67 The GOP had nine candidates that made at least one of the 
debates. Further, aside from Mitt Romney’s exclusion from the first debate and Jon Huntsman’s 
exclusion from the second debate, the debate requirements were not a meaningful issue of the 
primaries. While the 2012 debates were less contentious than 2008, 2016 would bring its own 
host of problems. 
The 2016 GOP primary debates were unlike any other in the country’s history. Expecting 
many candidates, the GOP created a commission called the Growth and Opportunity Project that 
was tasked with creating unilateral rules to govern the party’s primary debates.68 The 
commission limited the number of party-sanctioned debates and prescribed the location of the 
debates. The commission, however, did not establish rules for polling thresholds, leaving the 
networks in charge of who could participate. Media outlets took it upon themselves to establish 
more consistent debate qualifications. Since the GOP primaries had 21 candidates and twelve 
debates, media outlets and the party wanted to create a fair process for debate invitations. The 
GOP and their media partners accomplished this in two ways. First, the party featured undercard-
debates for those who did not make the primetime debate stage. This gave lower-polling 
longshot candidates the opportunity to present their ideas. Second, media outlets independently 
created comprehensive rules for debate requirements. Due to the increased size of the field and 
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the GOP’s intervention in the process, the 2016 GOP debates were the most procedurally 
developed and consistent in primary history.69 
Although the debate rules were consistent, the crowded field hurt the GOP’s ability to 
control the outcome of the nomination. The invisible primary failed to produce an establishment 
candidate. The top candidates in the early summer, which included Cruz, Bush, Kasich, Rubio 
and Carson, had a similar number of endorsements and had accumulated comparable funds.70 
The large field and lack of a clear establishment candidate worked in Donald Trump’s favor. The 
first debate on August 6th featured two debates with a total of 20 candidates. The first included 
the ten highest polling candidates, in order of their national polling averages.71 The under-card 
debate originally had a 1% polling threshold that was later removed to allow three additional 
candidates. In the September debate, a lack of polling allowed additional candidates to compete 
in the under-card debate.72 A week before the first primary, the GOP was still using a two-debate 
format featuring the eleven candidates in the race. After Iowa, the number of candidates allowed 
on the primetime stage was reduced to seven.73 Regardless, the damage was done. Candidates 
stayed in the race longer because they were making the debate stage in only the under-card stage. 
Only half of the 20 original candidates dropped out before the Iowa caucuses. Although the GOP 
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had created a consistent and developed debate process, an outsider still became the party 
nominee. The large debate stage and Trump’s rise in the polls allowed him to qualify for the 
debates and spread his message. 
In 2016, the debates were chaotic and resulted in the opposite of what the GOP 
establishment wanted. The political elite did not want Trump to be their party’s nominee and 
believed he could not win. In Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for 
the Meaning of America, John Sides, Lynn Vavreck, and Michael Tessler assess the media’s role 
in Trump’s nomination. They found that Trump’s constant media presence and attention-
grabbing debate performances made up for his organizational short-falls.74 He received more 
media coverage than the other candidates and did not pay a cent for it. The Democrats learned 
from this experience. They wanted a consistent system like the GOP debates, but without an 
extremist candidate on the ticket. 
 
2016 Democratic Debates 
 The 2016 Democratic primary was the opposite of the GOP experience. The primaries 
only contained a handful of candidates and featured a clear establishment candidate in Hillary 
Clinton. Not only was she arguably the most experienced candidate to ever run for the position, 
but also had a plethora of endorsements and a massive war chest. She won the invisible primary. 
In addition, she benefitted from the support of super delegates, who represented 15% of the total 
delegates at the convention.75 It was Hillary Clinton’s nomination to lose in 2016. 
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Nonetheless, she faced four other candidates in the first debate, including Vermont 
Senator Bernie Sanders, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, Virginia Senator Jim Webb and 
Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee. The Democratic debates originally only featured six 
debates, minimizing the likelihood a non-establishment candidate would have a breakout debate 
performance. The first debate in October hosted by CNN required candidates to have 1% or more 
support in three or more national polls.76 Lawrence Lessig, a law professor at Harvard, running 
for President was not invited to any of the debates for failing to register any support. Many saw 
his candidacy as perfunctory and considered his absence as uncontroversial.77 By the next debate 
in November, Chafee and Webb had both dropped out. Both of their campaigns failed to 
accumulate momentum. Martin O’Malley, the former Governor of Maryland, was almost left off 
the fourth debate in January for failing to reach 5% nationally.78 He complained that “this 
election is not up to NBC executives, not up to pollsters, its up to you, the people of Iowa.”79 He 
was later allowed on the debate stage after the chair of the party intervened on Twitter, writing 
she expected to see all the candidates on the stage.80 After New Hampshire, O’Malley dropped 
out leaving two candidates, Clinton and Sanders. The party also effectively got rid of 
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unsanctioned debates by refusing to give delegates to candidates that participated in them.81 This 
ensured that candidate would comply with the party’s rules. While the debate rules were 
consistent throughout the process, the DNC’s role in the primary process became a point of 
contention. 
The 2016 primaries left the Sanders campaign fuming. Although Hillary Clinton won the 
nomination on the first ballot, accumulating 54% of the total pledged delegates, Sanders alleged 
the DNC was working against him.82 First, his campaign complained that the lack of debates 
prevented Sanders from getting his name out. The DNC added three more debates after Senator 
Sanders became more relevant and complained. There were five debates that featured only 
Sanders and Clinton. While the GOP had twelve in 2016, the Democrats only had nine. His 
campaign also complained that the debates were on Saturday nights when people are out or 
watching sporting events The GOP debates in 2016 were on weekday nights. Third, they 
complained about the super delegate rules that supported Clinton. 83 Leaked emails from Debbie 
Wasserman Shultz, the chair of the DNC, only reinforced Bernie’s campaign theories. The 
emails revealed that Ms. Shultz questioned Sanders’ commitment to the party, claiming he 
speaks like “someone who has never been a member of the Democratic Party and has no 
understanding of what we do.”84 There is also evidence a Clinton lawyer advised the DNC on 
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how to deal with Sanders and created a narrative that Sanders never had an organized campaign. 
The complaints against the DNC and leaked emails required them to act to ensure a fairer 
nomination process for 2020. 
 
The 2020 Debates 
Prior to 2020, the Democratic primary debate qualification rules were inconsistent. The 
requirements for some debates were set by the media outlet hosting them. In other instances, the 
DNC intervened, setting their own guidelines. In addition, the requirements varied by debate. In 
the 2008 cycle, some debates required a candidate to have a campaign staff in early primary 
voting states to qualify, while other debates relied simply on polling numbers. The 
inconsistencies frustrated candidates that were left off the stage, many of whom argued the rules 
were unclear and harmed their candidacy. In February of 2019, the DNC created a unilateral set 
of rules for its primary debates and made an unprecedented decision to create a new system for 
debate qualification. In addition to needing a minimum percentage in national and state polls, 
candidates were incentivized to raise money from as many Americans as possible. I hypothesize 
that these prior inconsistencies pushed the Democrats to create comprehensive debate 
requirements. Moreover, I believe the decision allows the party to create rules that work in their 
favor rather than in the favor of media outlets. 
By taking the debate threshold out of the hands of media outlets, and setting them for 
themselves, the DNC works to reassert its power in the process. The requirements, which are the 




	 	 							Charap 
	 32	
DNC did not want as many under-card debates as the Republicans had in 2016. As such, 
candidates that failed to meet the progressively strict requirements will be forced to drop out of 
the race. Not making the debate makes it harder for candidates to raise money and garner media 
attention. The strict debate requirements also make it difficult for long-shot candidates to gain 
momentum. This further ensures that an establishment candidate will win the party’s nominee. 
 
Background on the 2020 Decision 
In 2017, Tom Perez was elected by the senior members of the DNC, in part to lead the 
nomination process. His qualifications were impressive, serving as the Secretary of Labor and 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under President Obama. Perez outlined his party’s 
goals for the 2020 presidential election. Perez made it a priority to improve the debate structure 
of his party. In a press release, Perez announced his goals, stating that he wanted to “give the 
grassroots a bigger voice than ever before; showcase [Democratic] candidates on an array of 
media platforms; present an opportunity for vigorous discussion about issues, ideas and 
solutions; and reach as many potential voters as possible.”85 In addition, Perez wanted a 
nomination process that could handle a large primary field and winnow it quickly. He noted that 
he was a not a fan of under-card debates and wanted a discussion of substantive issues instead of 
“debates about hand-size,” referring to the 2016 GOP primary debates.86   
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Perez had a little over a year to create rules that aligned with his agenda. Media reports 
claim that DNC officials created a committee that met 80 to 100 times to discuss the debate 
structure.87 The most difficult decision was how to create new debate qualifying requirements. 
Several options were presented. They could use the minimum polling percentage they had used 
in 2016. Second, they considered requiring candidates to have a certain number of paid staffers 
in early primary states. Third, they considered adding a fundraising component and requiring 
candidates to raise a minimum amount of money or have a minimum number of donors. They 
spoke with former candidates and campaign managers and conducted research to make their 
decision.88 The criteria were announced in February 2019: 
Democratic candidates may qualify for the first and second debate by meeting 
one of the two following sets of criteria: 
Polling Method: Register 1% or more support in three polls (which may be 
national polls, or polls in Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and/or 
Nevada) publicly released between January 1, 2019, and 14 days prior to the 
date of the Organization Debate… Any candidate’s three qualifying polls must 
be conducted by different organizations, or if by the same organization, must 
be in different geographical areas. 
Grassroots Fundraising Method. Candidates may qualify for the debate by 
demonstrating that the campaign has received donations from at least (1) 
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65,000 unique donors; and (2) a minimum of 200 unique donors per state in at 
least 20 U.S. states.  To demonstrate that the fundraising threshold has been 
reached, candidates must provide verifiable evidence, which they may do by 
authorizing ActBlue and/or NGP VAN to provide that evidence. 
If more than 20 candidates qualify for the debate, the top 20 candidates will be 
selected using a methodology that gives primacy to candidates meeting both 
thresholds, followed by the highest polling average, followed by the most 
unique donors.89 
 In May 2019, the DNC announced they were going to use similar criteria for the third and 
fourth debates. The polling requirement was increased to 2% and the grassroots fundraising 
threshold increased to 130,000 donors with at least 400 unique donors in at least twenty states.90 
In September, the DNC announced a change to the polling requirements for the fifth and sixth 
debates. Candidates needed either four polls above 4% or two polls above 5% in early states.91 
The DNC wanted to incentivize candidates to focus on early states. In addition, the grassroots 
fundraising threshold increased to 165,000 donors and 600 unique donors in at least 20 states.92 
The seventh debate further increased the standards for polling and fundraising.93 The eighth 
debate rules are like the seventh, except for the added provision that all candidates that gain one 
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pledged delegate in the Iowa caucus automatically qualify.94 Delegates in Iowa are only awarded 
to candidates that garner more than 15% of the final vote. The ninth and tenth debates are similar 
to the eighth, but remove the fundraising threshold.95 Finally, the eleventh debate requires 
candidates to have at least 20% of the pledged delegates awarded by March 15th to qualify.96  The 
DNC has not yet announced the rules for a possible twelfth debate. 
The number of donors was decided in consultation with ActBlue. ActBlue is campaign 
fundraising website that makes it easy for people to donate to their candidate of choice. The site 
keeps a donor’s disclosure documents and credit card on file. The DNC decided the number of 
donors by working with the site and consultants who analyzed historical donor trends from the 
2016 election and FEC disclosures from Congressional elections. Those that made the decisions 
asserted that it was the best way to meet their grassroots goal. Tom Perez believes that “if you 
want to be president of the United States, you have to develop a proficiency at grassroots 
fundraising.”97 Thus, he dubbed it the grassroots fundraising threshold. It incentivizes campaigns 
to build their fundraising infrastructure. A candidate that is not necessarily polling well early, but 
is developing their fundraising techniques will benefit from the donor requirement. Moreover, 
Perez hopes that it will help the DNC in the general election. This large base of donors may not 
only donate in the general election, but also may volunteer or participate in other ways to support 
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the Democrats. By encouraging donations of any size, Perez wanted to encourage as many 
people as possible to participate in politics. 
 After the decision was made there was pushback from campaigns and pundits. Michael 
Bennett, who qualified for the first two debates and failed to qualify for the subsequent three 
debates, believes the DNC has mixed priorities. The DNC should not “be favoring national 
fundraising and cable television over the early states like New Hampshire.”98 A senior Democrat 
campaign advisor shares Bennett’s view. It forces candidates to choose “between focusing on 
Iowa or New Hampshire or focusing on making these national requirements.”99 These comments 
were made before the early state polling criteria for debate five and six. Some have also 
complained about the lack of transparency in the process. They argue that the new criteria were 
released without consulting candidates or middle to lower level DNC officials. The resistance to 
the change prompted the need for a thorough analysis on the decision to include strict 
requirements. 
 The debate requirements announced by the DNC for 2020 were the result of several 
conflicting incentives. First, the Democrats did not want ten candidates going into Iowa. The 
DNC, under the direction of Tom Perez, wanted to sufficiently winnow the field before the first 
primary. Less candidates translates into a shorter primary season and an increased focus on the 
general. He also wanted to avoid a repeat of the GOP’s process where a long-shot candidate was 
nominated as Trump had been in 2016. He expected a big primary field for 2020 with candidates 
looking to raise their profile and defeat a widely unpopular incumbent. He wanted a barrier to 
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entry that “was not a layup, but also not a half-court shot.”100 Second, he wanted to prevent any 
suspicion that the party favored one candidate over another. The DNC needed to respond to the 
previous complaints from O’Malley and Sanders. The party wanted candidates to believe it had 
taken its foot off the scale with consistent qualification thresholds set by the party, not 
independent media outlets. Only the DNC could control this vital responsibility. The DNC had to 
weigh its internal desire to the control the outcome of the process, while appearing to be 
impartial. The untested 2020 requirements were created to remedy these conflicting interests. 
 
Discussion 
Hypothesis One: The DNC changed the criteria to combat the rise in the number of candidates 
The increasing number of candidates in modern primaries particularly the GOP’s 2016 
primary is one reason why the Democrats instituted strict debate rules for 2020. There were a 
total of twenty-nine major Democratic presidential candidates vying for their party’s nomination 
in 2020, eight more than the GOP in 2016. The unprecedented number of candidates required a 
comprehensive system for winnowing. Thus, the DNC turned to debate rules. Those that failed to 
make the debate stage were likely to experience a drop in poll numbers and poor fundraising 
causing them to end their candidacy. The stricter requirements would also speed up the 
winnowing process, forcing voters to choose from a handful of candidates as opposed to over 
twenty-five. 
 In the history of Democratic presidential debates, the largest number of candidates that 
had appeared on a debate stage was ten in 2004. Still, the 2004 primaries did not host an 
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undercard debate. In addition, the Democrats and media outlets have allowed most major 
candidates, with some exceptions in 2008, to compete in the debates up until the first primary. In 
2008, Gravel and Kucinich were excluded from early debates because they failed to meet some 
aspects of the debate requirements. While some of the rules seemed arbitrary, their campaigns 
failed to gain traction. Both were outsider candidates that lacked formal campaign organizations 
in many early primary states. The 2020 campaign was a new test for Democrats. They could no 
longer rely on media outlets and candidates voluntarily dropping out to winnow the field. 
Instead, they decided to use debate requirements.  
In anticipation of more candidates in 2020 than 2016, the DNC announced the rule 
changes in February, before most candidates had officially announced their candidacy. Potential 
Democratic candidates had three major incentives to run in 2020. First, there was no clear 
favorite in the race as there was in 2016, despite Vice President Joe Biden’s, Senator Corey 
Booker’s and Senator Bernie Sanders’ early endorsements and fundraising. Second, as more 
candidates entered the race, a candidate on the edge became more likely to run. With twenty 
candidates already in the race, the so-called marginal candidate had little to lose by joining the 
race. Third, all the Democratic candidates believed that they could beat Trump. Since Hillary 
Clinton, an establishment candidate lost in 2016, many non-establishment candidates joined the 
race to offer an alternative. Their campaigns appealed to voters by claiming Democrats needed a 
new approach to beating Trump. The confluence of these factors meant that the DNC knew they 
were going to see more candidates in 2020 and needed a method for quickly winnowing the 
field. 
The stricter debate rules change forced candidates to continually reassess their campaigns 
long-term viability. Even before the first primary, candidates face decisions on whether to 
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remain in the race. Prior to the rule change in 2020, low-polling candidates could hope for a 
breakout debate performance to increase their name recognition and fundraising efforts. This 
process has sped up and longshot candidates now have a limited number of attempts to have an 
outstanding debate performance.  
Regardless of when a candidate drops out of the race, the decision-making process is the 
same. Norrander’s comprehensive study analyzes presidential primaries from 1980 to 2004. 
Those dropping out after the first primary are considering initial assets and characteristics 
(national poll standings, fund-raising totals and occupational background), initial contest 
outcomes (Iowa and New Hampshire) and structural variables (proportional representation 
delegate distribution rules, party, front-loaded calendar).101 Besides the New Hampshire and 
Iowa results, her duration model predicts that poll standings, occupational background and 
funding shaped the length of a candidates bid for the nomination.102 The long primary season 
with stricter and stricter debate requirements makes candidates constantly rethink their 
candidacy. Moreover, without access to debates, candidates face difficulties increasing their 
polling and fundraising efforts. The new debate thresholds and failure to make the debate stage 
make it harder for candidates to justify their campaign.  
 
Hypothesis Two: Change in Democratic requirements due to previous inconsistencies  
 Another reason the DNC changed the debate requirements for 2020 was because they 
wanted to establish consistent requirements. The inconsistencies in 2008 and 2012 created 
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confusion and avenues of attack for candidates that missed the debate thresholds. The 
Democrats’ rules build upon the Republican’s attempt in 2016. The Democrats wanted unilateral 
control over the entire process, to ensure fair and comprehensive debate rules.  
 Prior to 2008, the Democratic debate requirements were not meant to exclude candidates. 
Most candidates made the debate stage and dropped out of the race after the first primaries, not 
after failing to make a debate. In 2008, however, inconsistencies in the debate rules led to 
multiple complaints. When Gravel and Kucinich were excluded in December of 2007, the two 
candidates gained media attention for their legal battles and put the party in a difficult position. 
The party did not want it to appear like they were excluding candidates and stifling the process. 
However, they also did not want to give a voice to candidates that were unlikely to garner 
delegates in the primaries and would more likely take attention from the individual who would in 
fact be the Democratic nominee. Furthermore, at the time it was not the parties making the 
decisions, but rather media outlets. The 2008 debate cycle was a signal to Democrats that their 
process needed to be reformed. 
 In 2016, the Democrats only had six candidates on the first debate stage. Nonetheless, 
Martin O’Malley complained about being excluded from a debate after the New Hampshire 
primary. He was later allowed to participate, despite failing to meet the requirements. In the 
same cycle, the GOP created the most comprehensive rules in their history. The DNC recognized 
it needed its own comprehensive system to account for the large number of candidates. The 
Democrats, under the direction of Tom Perez, created the new system for 2020. With the new 
rules, candidates would no longer be able to complain about lack of clarity or inconsistencies in 
debate rules. 
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Hypothesis Three: Democrats want more control over setting rules, taking it away from the 
media 
 Before 2020, neither major party had control over who made the primary debate stage. 
The criteria were set by media outlets and candidates who were excluded channeled their 
complaints toward the party. Due to the inconsistent rules among the major media outlets, the 
Democrats needed to intervene. Since the media and the DNC do not have the same incentives 
regarding primary debate system, the DNC believed it was necessary to take unilateral control. 
 In the United States, media outlets are run as a for-profit business. Newspapers, cable and 
online news outlets profit from viewership and advertising revenue. In fact, the revenue of major 
media outlets is cyclical and rises and falls with election years.103 For the largest media 
companies, debates often give them their highest viewership numbers of the year. The first 
Democratic debate in 2020 had 15.3 million viewers on the first night and 18.1 million viewers 
on the second night.104 This beats the previous primary debate record-holder made in 2015. For 
comparison, the most watched news program in October 2019 was Hannity on Fox News and it 
had 3.5 million viewers per night.105  
These primary events are highly publicized and lead the headlines. A debate that creates 
headlines leads to more views, more expensive advertising slots and subsequently more profit. 
One journalist notes that “the high [debate] viewership is likely to turbocharge an already 
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significant investment in political coverage, which has pushed up revenues and ratings.”106 Thus, 
the outlet that has the privilege of holding the debate has an incentive to increase viewership. 
While the business office of most major media outlets does not explicitly tell their debate staff to 
create a spectacle, a non-controversial debate is not in their best interest. Controversy is linked to 
clicks, views and profit. Media outlets must weigh this with their desire to seem like they are 
impartial. Otherwise, the outlet may lose their ability to host debates in the future and viewers 
will not consider them trustworthy. In 2013, the GOP announced that it would prohibit CNN and 
NBC from hosting the Republican 2016 presidential primary debates.107 The GOP alleged that 
outlets were “undermining the perceived objectivity of the coverage of the 2016 presidential 
campaign.”108 The GOP noted that these two news outlets had a pro-Democrat agenda in the 
2012 election, claiming they were trying to appeal to their liberal viewers. Media outlets try to 
increase viewership and profit, while also trying to stay impartial and maintain the right to host 
debates. 
 In addition to trying to increase viewership and appearing impartial, media outlets want 
to host a meaningful debate to educate potential voters on the candidates. While media outlets 
want voters to make an informed decision, they must also grapple with the fact that not all 
candidates are equal. Why should a candidate polling with less than 5% favorability be allowed 
to participate in a debate with candidates that have 20% favorability? Each media outlet solves 
this problem differently. CNN reversed its decision to exclude Gravel in July, 2007, although he 
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did not meet the requirements. In November 2007, CNN added a fundraising component, which 
excluded him from the debate stage. NBC included all the candidates in their first debate in April 
2007. In October, the company excluded Gravel in October for missing the fundraising 
threshold. The changes in requirements were up to the discretion of the media outlets. 
Nonetheless, candidates blamed both media companies and the party for failing to include them. 
Many claimed that they were stifling free speech. To be more even-handed and give clarity to the 
process, the DNC took unilateral control of the requirements for 2020. 
Unlike the major media companies, the DNC is not driven by profit. It does not benefit 
directly from the advertising revenue generated during debates, nor does it gain financially from 
high viewership. A highly viewed debate in the eyes of the DNC helps the voters decide on their 
candidate more quickly and encourages people to become more politically involved. The DNC 
wants their debates to produce a favorite, educate voters and increase political activism. 
 
Hypothesis Four: Democratic change created to streamline the process hurts long-shot candidates  
 There is no question that the new debate requirements were created to bring order to the 
primary process. After the GOP in 2016, senior party officials recognized the need to be more 
clear in their qualification thresholds. Moreover, the DNC’s control allows them to create 
thresholds that align with meeting their goals. These goals are again to produce an electable 
candidate and to create a strong organization for the general. The order created by the DNC, 
however, comes at the cost of long-shot candidates that had previously been in the race until the 
Iowa caucuses.  
 Prior to 2020, candidates allocated their resources in a manner that would increase their 
chances of winning the nomination. Per Paul-Henri Gurian, there are two strategies for resource 
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allocation in primaries that are determined by the competitiveness of the candidate.109 Long-shot 
candidates try to develop momentum by allocating their resources in early primaries, which are 
expected to be covered extensively by the media. On the other hand, established candidates will 
focus on garnering the largest number of delegates to secure the nomination. Self-funded 
candidates are excluded from this discussion because they are not constrained by a limited 
amount of money.  
 In 2020, the long-shot candidates have unsurprisingly been the first to be excluded from 
the debate stage. The DNC only featured two debates with two debate stages. Since the ABC 
September debate, there have been a maximum of twelve candidates on the stage. The long-shot 
candidates that have failed to garner material support include Julián Castro, Beto O’Rourke, Tim 
Ryan, Bill de Blasio, Jay Inslee, Tim Ryan, Joe Sestak, Steve Bullock, John Hickenlooper and 
Eric Swalwell. These candidates had dropped out of the race by December 2019, a month before 
the first primary. Many of these candidates explicitly cited the heightened debate requirements in 
describing their failure to gain momentum. In a fundraising email circulated in September, Beto 
O’Rourke wrote it would be the “end of [his] campaign” if he did not qualify for the November 
debate.110 Similarly, Bill de Blasio told CNN that “it's really tough to conceive of continuing” a 
campaign without making the October debate.111 While the debate requirements are not entirely 
to blame for their failures, they are consistently cited as hurting unlikely candidacies.  
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The debate criteria rules will fundamentally alter the resource allocation of long-shot 
candidates both staff wise and financially. Instead of focusing on winning, they must focus on 
meeting the DNC’s strict debate thresholds. This is what led to Senator Gillibrand’s outrageous 
t-shirt promotion on Facebook. Her campaign knew that failing to make the debate stage would 
be the end of her campaign. She would not be considered viable if she did not make the stage. 




How do primary debate rules shape the contours of the process? Previous political science 
literature on the primary process focuses on the role of parties and the elite, typically centering 
on the invisible primary. Political communication scholars have researched general election 
debates and the role of media and momentum in primary campaigns. However, there is no 
existing literature on the importance of primary debate thresholds and the DNC’s 2020 criteria. 
This thesis provides a contemporary analysis of primary debate requirements and their 
importance in the nomination process. It outlines the responsibilities and incentives of parties, 
media outlets and candidates. Furthermore, the historical analysis demonstrates how the debate 
criteria have changed over time. The increased number of candidates, previous inconsistencies in 
the requirements and media’s control of the debates have created numerous problems for the 
DNC. More importantly, it made the DNC seem like it was not in control of the process and led 
to accusations of bias. Thus, the DNC implemented comprehensive requirements for 2020. In 
doing so, they created rules that would benefit the party and hurt long-shot candidates.  
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 The DNC’s new rules on primary debate requirements have a material impact on the 
candidate selection process. On the one hand, the DNC must try to appease all the candidates and 
avoid appearing biased toward establishment candidates. On the other hand, the DNC wants to 
have a smooth process and prevent an unknown outsider candidate from taking over the party, as 
Trump did to the GOP in 2016. The Democrats needed a mechanism to winnow candidates 
quickly and prevent the rise of an outsider candidate. The Democrats wanted to appear 
trustworthy and in-control in the eyes of the American people. The 2020 rules set out to 
accomplish both goals. When they are attacked for being biased, the DNC has argued that the 
rules have been in place for months and are consistent. Nonetheless, the rules are significantly 
stricter than previous years and make it harder for disorganized candidates to make the stage. 
The DNC is thus shaping the outcome, without appearing to do so. 
 In 2016, the Democratic party attempted to walk this tight-rope with Vermont Senator 
Bernie Sanders in 2016. Sanders was the only candidate that could compete with Hillary Clinton 
for the Democratic nomination. To the surprise of the DNC, his campaign became competitive, 
relying on grassroots funding and organizing. The DNC did not want a self-identified 
Democratic Socialist to represent the party. His stances differed staunchly from those in the 
DNC’s party platform, which were agreed to at the party’s convention, and more aligned with 
Clinton’s positions. Therefore, the DNC elite agreed to support Clinton at the party’s convention 
in 2016. Nonetheless, the party also did not want to appear to be influencing the process. The 
days of nominees being chosen by the political elite in smoke-filled conference rooms were over. 
Emails released by WikiLeaks after the convention have confirmed some of the suspicions of the 
Sanders campaign regarding the DNC’s objectivity. The DNC’s embarrassment when the emails 
were revealed further underscored their need to appear impartial. The 2020 debate rules 
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attempted to achieve the DNC’s objectives in controlling the primary field without appearing to 
influence it.   
 While the rules are extremely detailed, they do not address all the DNC’s issues. For 
example, the DNC will continue to rely on media outlets to commission the polls used for 
polling thresholds. The DNC neither has the resources, nor the desire to invest in the resources to 
conduct expensive and laborious polls. The 2020 debate requirements list the polling companies 
that candidates can use to qualify for the debates.112 Media companies, however, do not only 
conduct polls for the DNC. They are for-profit companies that issue polls that their company can 
use on television and report on. This was a problem for Tom Perez in January, 2020 because 
there were not enough polls commissioned that could help candidates qualify for the DNC 
debates.113 Candidates Andrew Yang and Tom Steyer complained that they would not make the 
debate due to the lack of polls performed between the end of December to early January. In 
December, a DNC spokeswoman asked the “expansive list of 16 qualifying poll sponsors [to] 
conduct more independent polling” that could be used as debate criteria.114 In this case, the DNC 
is ceding authority to the media as a result of not owning the entire process. This is exactly what 
the DNC wanted to prevent when they unilaterally created the debate rules without input or 
alignment with the pollsters or media outlets. 
In addition, the DNC never clarified how they would handle candidates that did not 
conduct any fundraising. Billionaire Tom Steyer spent his own money to meet the DNC’s 
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grassroots funding threshold.115 On the other hand, billionaire Michael Bloomberg entered the 
race late, skipped early primaries and refused to spend his money to meet the threshold.116 Thus, 
he was excluded from several debates in late January and early February. The DNC got rid of the 
funding threshold in February and changed the requirements to 10% or higher in four qualifying 
polls or winning at least one delegate in an early primary state.117 The party changed the rules 
because they believed that “now that the grassroots support is actually captured in real voting, 
the criteria will no longer require a donor threshold.”118 The rules can change if the party wants 
them to change. This gives the party flexibility during the primary process to control the debate 
stage. While Bloomberg qualified for the February 19th NBC debate, Yang and Steyer did not.119 
Their exclusion eventually contributed to the end of their respective campaigns. The DNC’s 
decision to change the criteria in the middle of the process demonstrates their ability to 
manipulate the process and candidate selection. Despite instituting early clear qualifications for 
inclusion in debates, the DNC can still bend rules to keep certain candidates off the debate stage 
and allow others to participate. 
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The DNC’s new debate rules for 2020 also helped the party grow its grassroots 
connections, which in turn strengthens the party itself. By incentivizing candidates to prioritize 
donations using the grassroots funding threshold for the debates, the DNC has expanded its 
network of activists. Tom Perez was chosen to lead the DNC in part due to his experience in this 
type of organizing. A day before the 2018 midterm elections, Perez met with Robert Siegel from 
National Public Radio to speak about his priorities as DNC Chair. He asserted that “mobilizing is 
that sprint up to the election. But [the Democrats] weren’t good at organizing. Organizing is the 
marathon. It's talking to people 12 months a year. It's building relationships with people. And 
[the Democrats] used to be the best at that.”120 Perez hopes that the threshold requirement will 
help the DNC in the general election. By encouraging donations of any size, Perez wants to 
inspire as many people as possible to participate in politics. This large base of donors may not 
only help fund the general election, but also may encourage people to volunteer or participate in 
other ways to support the Democrats. In addition, the DNC is requiring campaigns to use 
ActBlue to collect the donations and to report them to the DNC.121 The site collects information 
about donors including their credit card number, address and occupation. The valuable data is 
stored by the site and can be used by the DNC for future solicitations. This data, now owned by 
the DNC, strengthens the party by expanding its network and its fundraising capacity. The new 
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2020 debate rules not only cultivate more donors for the party, but also strengthens the party 
itself. 
 Future research on the topic should include on a comprehensive analysis of the 2020 
nomination process. Since this paper was written during the 2020 nomination process, it was 
difficult to include all aspects of the debates. In addition, future research should include 
interviews with members of each campaign and interviews with DNC officials. These sources 
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